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This article is intended to provide a brief overview of 
some of the links which need to be established 
between sectoral and macro-planning. In the process 
it discusses some of the planning methods used in 
the small open economies of the Caribbean and pro-
vides some ideas as to the direction in which they 
may evolve over time. While examples are drawn 
principally from the experience of Trinidad and 
Tobago, the basic principles, as well as the more 
general comments, apply faithfully to the planning 
patterns prevailing in most Caribbean countries. 
The article is divided into three parts. Firstly, 
some comments are made about the broader macro-
economic developments in Trinidad and Tobago 
since 1973, and an attempt is made to fit agricultural 
sector performance into that context. Secondly, the 
paper discusses various approaches to planning, pro-
gressing from the most basic to more complex and 
integrated approaches. An artempt ¡s made to estab-
lish the relationship between sectoral and macro-
economic planning and in so doing integrate the 
"top down" and "button up" planning approaches 
which will be necessary in order to create the consen-
sus required for effective plan implementation. 
Thirdly, before providing a summary of conclusions, 
some of the constraints which must be faced by 
planners in the region are also identified. 
•Regional Economic Advisor, ECLAC Subregional 
Headquarters for the Caribbean. 
I 
An overview of economic 
trends and policies 
The petroleum price increases between late 1973 
and 1980 brought windfall gains to Trinidad and 
Tobago and permitted a level of economic activ-
ity, and an increase in the standard of living, not 
previously experienced. 
Because it is an extractive industry, with 
limited linkages into the domestic economy as a 
whole, in the first round these windfall gains 
accrued primarily to the public sector in the form 
of increased revenues. In the second round, as 
the government distributed these revenues in 
the form of increased staffing of, or salaries for, 
the civil service; expanded welfare programmes; 
widely increased subsidies or a rapid increase in 
investment projects, the oil revenues impacted 
upon the other sectors and ultimately upon the 
standard of living and levels of consumption of 
the population as a whole. 
Since the oil boom was also an export boom, 
it generated rapidly increasing quantities of for-
eign exchange and permitted the removal of the 
import constraints that had affected the econ-
omy up to 1973. While there was a rapid increase 
in imports, it was also possible (at least initially) 
to achieve a great increase in reserves and to 
benefit from the capital revenues which came 
from them. 
Real weekly earnings increased by 6% per 
annum between I976and 1982, while the rate of 
unemployment fell from 17% to 10% over the 
same period. 
Real national income is estimated to have 
risen by one-third between 1973 and the second 
oil price increase in 1981. A fair portion of this 
increased income was also transmitted to the 
poorest sectors, through increased employment, 
make-work schemes, and a series of subsidies 
tailored to their needs. At the same time, a fairly 
large programme of investments in activities 
downstream from the petroleum sector were put 
into operation (ammonia, urea, methanol and 
steel). 
Due to the rapid increase in income, how-
ever, many of the productive factors were over-
strained and a series of dislocations were created. 
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Increased incomes were not matched by 
increased productivity, many of the unskilled 
were employed to do skilled work, and others 
were employed to do non-productive tasks. 
Increased consumer demand could not therefore 
be matched by increased domestic production, 
resulting in a rapid increase in prices and 
imports. This was exacerbated by the fact that 
many local manufactures were large users of 
foreign exchange. 
Costs of production increased rapidly, and 
while these increases were easily absorbed by 
local consumers, the effect was that industries 
were no longer competitive on the wider export 
markets, or even within the protected CARICOM 
market. 
Finally, there were significant reallocations 
of resources into areas such as the distribution of 
imported goods, construction, and real estate, 
while at the same time there was a shift of 
resources out of sectors such as agriculture. 
By 1982, a decline in petroleum output 
which had started in the late 1970s was joined by 
falling oil prices: a trend which has continued up 
to the present. Accordingly, many of the policies 
developed in the 1970s are no longer sustainable, 
and the dislocations created are now in the pro-
cess of being corrected. Evidence of this readjust-
ment is seen in reduced government 
expenditures, a variety of new sectoral policies, 
and regulations regarding foreign purchases, 
while the process of realigning the local currency 
has also begun. 
1. Agricultural sector performance 
The impact of past macro-economic trends and 
policies upon the agriculture sector was quite 
significant. Even though agriculture had not 
played a major role in the economy prior to 1973 
its share of GDP was nevertheless halved 
between 1973 and 1982, standing in the latter 
year at only 2.7%. By 1985 this trend had been 
reversed somewhat due to the impact of changed 
economic conditions and policies, so that by the 
end of that year its contribution had increased to 
3.7%. 
Between 1971 and 1982, food imports 
doubled in terms of volume but increased eight-
fold in terms of prices. In 1980, 90% of food 
needs had to be met through imports. The 
decline in agriculture was further demonstrated 
by the fact that labour was moving out of the 
sector, due no doubt to the fact that real wages 
declined. Agriculture absorbed about 18% of the 
labour force in 1974, but by 1984 this had gone 
down to 8%. Once again the trend seems to have 
been reversed, since this percentage grew to 
10% by the end of 1985. 
In effect what was happening was that, in 
line with a development philosophy common to 
the whole region, emphasis was being placed on 
industry as the path by which development 
would be pursued. These trends were evident 
throughout the region, but as in many countries 
the resources were more limited, the shifts in 
emphasis were not as dramatic. This very 
marked shift away from agriculture was also 
evident in other oil economies, such as Nigeria, 
which had traditionally been a major agricultural 
producer before its oil boom. Nevertheless, 
Indonesia provides an example showing that it is 
possible to develop an oil economy without ham-
pering agricultural development, provided the 
appropriate macro-economic policies are 
applied. 
Subsequent evaluation of the agriculture sec-
tor in Trinidad has listed a number of reasons for 
the decline of the sector: 
a) Inadequate physical infrastructure; 
b) High cost and/or shortage of labour; 
c) Outflow of capital from the sector; 
d) Social problems such as praedial larceny; 
e) Excessive concentration on the export 
sector; 
f) Insufficient research and development; 
g) Competition from foreign food and 
dumping; 
h) Shortage of professional and technical skills; 
i) Declining public sector investment in agri-
culture, and 
j) Spread of urban culture throughout the 
society. 
Now that foreign exchange has resurfaced as 
a major economic constraint, and ways have to 
be found to earn and to save more foreign 
exchange, agriculture comes under scrutiny once 
more, since food imports constitute a major part 
of the foreign exchange bill. Moreover, agricul-
tural exports have in the past been a significant 
contributor to foreign earnings. 
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By now, moreover, a number of things have 
changed in the sector, particularly in relation to 
export markets. The traditional export crops are 
now facing serious competition, and decisions 
need to be taken as to whether they can be placed 
on a competitive footing or whether new pro-
ducts should be tried. This is a particularly 
urgent decision, since about 70% of the land in 
production is in export crops such as sugar, cof-
fee, cocoa, or citrus. Moreover, sugar production 
is a drain on the budget, the industry requiring 
TT$300 million per year in subsidies. 
In actual fact, it would seem that a decision 
has been taken to retain the most productive 
Most of the facts given in the short analysis 
above are already well known, and even if they 
are interpreted in different ways it will probably 
be agreed that there is a case for some form of 
systematic planning. Moreover, it is clear that 
whatever it is desired to do in the sector, such 
goals cannot be achieved if the overall macro-
economic conditions are not in harmony. Conse-
quently, there is a strong case for an integrated 
approach to planning of both specific sectors and 
of the overall economy. 
A tendency has recently developed in the 
Caribbean not to talk too much about economic 
planning, but rather to emphasize economic 
management. This probably arises from a disen-
chantment with "planning" as practised in the 
past, and a need to emphasize the continuous 
process of guiding and fine tuning the economy 
that is essential for the effective achievement of 
planning goals. It must be conceded, however, 
that it is desirable to set out the planning process 
in a plan document, since this can help to pro-
vide a systematic approach to co-ordinating 
development decisions. An explicit plan can also 
provide a basis for judging performance at set 
intervals and for correcting those things that 
have not been achieved. So, although it must be 
acknowledged that planning can conceivably 
proceed without a formal document, such a docu-
parts of the traditional crops and to phase in new 
export crops where possible, with the remainder 
of the land being earmarked for domestic food 
production. But it is not clear whether decisions 
have been taken regarding what crops should be 
emphasized (based on a ranking of what can 
most efficiently be produced) and in what quan-
tities (based on a knowledge of market require-
ments). It seems that these are issues for the 
agriculture planners, and it would be interesting 
to hear whether an investigation has been made 
in this respect and what its results have been. 
The implications for a land use policy are also 
obvious. 
ment may be a useful way-station in the plan-
ning process. 
All those dealing with the Caribbean are 
familiar with the three or five-year development 
plans, which absorb enormous creative energy 
and human resources, but are often left to lan-
guish on a shelf: not followed; never updated to 
adjust to the rapidly changing environment; 
sometimes never approved by the political direc-
torate. There are also plans which are merely 
expressions of hope, or else are cynically 
intended for window dressing, unconstrained 
either by administrative or financial limits; inco-
herent plans that have a little something for 
everyone, but which add up to inconsistent and 
unworkable policies; plans which set goals with-
out providing any suggestions of the means, or 
the instruments, that will be needed to achieve 
them, and yet other plans which leave out the 
politically difficult parts. 
The existence of a plan, therefore, does not 
mean that the community has either the will or 
the means to implement it. As a result, while 
there has tended to be disenchantment with 
planning in some circles, in others perhaps a 
false hope has been instilled that the plan will be 
the panacea for development problems. A realis-
tic evaluation will probably come somewhere 
between these two extremes. 
II 
The orientation of policies towards specific goals 
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1. Planning stages in a mixed 
economy 
It may now be useful to discuss briefly some of 
the more common mechanisms used in the 
region, particularly as they relate to mixed 
economies. 
Planning is more complex in mixed econo-
mies because in this system the planner has less 
influence over all the economic actors than is the 
case where the economy is concentrated in the 
public sector. Moreover, prices —which are sub-
ject to relatively free fluctuation in the mixed 
economy— change more rapidly than in a sys-
tem where they are fixed administratively, and 
where both pricing systems coexist, there is the 
danger of sending inconsistent signals to the 
various economic actors. For convenience it may 
be useful to separate the planning processes used 
in mixed economies into three distinct stages of 
increasing complexity, with the understanding 
that conceptually they tend to progress from one 
to the other, in a continuum. 
The basic minimum begins with the national 
budget, prepared on an annual basis. This is 
usually the starting point for most countries and 
provides indications for the forthcoming one-
year period about expected revenues and expen-
ditures, the latter being divided into recurrent 
expenditures and capital expenditures which 
will be undertaken by the government. At a 
more advanced level, the budget might include 
estimates of expenditures of all public sector 
entities. Either integrated with this or separate 
from it, there may also be a list of projects which 
will account for the total expenditure over the 
budget period. 
For some of the Caribbean countries, this is 
as far as they are able to go in the planning 
exercise given the level of resources (particularly 
planning skills) available to them, the prepara-
tion of a slate of projects strains the resources of 
most of the countries in the area, and accomp-
lishing this is often as much as the resources can 
manage. 
But the budget is sometimes not a very accu-
rate reflection of what is intended for the next 
year. All those who have worked in the public 
sector know that the bases on which budget 
estimates are made are not always the most 
scientific. Those who have worked in Ministries 
of Finance know that there is often a tendency to 
underestimate revenues at the first round in 
order to contain demands, while in the other 
Ministries there is a tendency to pad the esti-
mates in the knowledge that the Ministry of 
Finance will make cuts. Then, as there is a desire 
to maximize expenditure, both in the hope of 
forcing the pace of development as well as in an 
effort to gain the kudos to be derived from a big 
budget, the political directorate might once 
again inflate estimates of revenue, and so on. 
The fact is that there is an element of games-
manship in the budget exercise that really has no 
place in the more formal, and supposedly more 
scientific, planning process. 
At this stage, it will be necessary to examine 
how the slate of projects is compiled. In some 
cases, the projects surface because there is an 
indication that finance may be forthcoming from 
a donor for such activities: this indication may be 
given by the lending or aid policies of multilat-
eral or bilateral donors. However, these policies 
may or may not coincide with the particular 
development priorities or needs of the recipient 
country. 
Alternatively, the slate of projects may be 
biased towards a sector which has developed the 
expertise to prepare projects in the past. This 
accumulated experience has not usually resided 
in the Ministry of Agriculture, but in truth these 
biases have represented relatively minor evils, 
since the greatest problem for most developing 
countries is the difficulty in compiling a reasona-
ble slate of carefully prepared and viable 
projects. 
The shortcomings of the project-by-project 
approach are, however, obvious, since the pro-
jects tend not to have any unifying basis, or any 
common policy thread. There is probably no 
systematic basis on which to assign priorities to 
them, either by sector or within sectors. 
The Integrated Public Sector Investment 
Programme, which attempts to remedy the 
shortfalls of the case-by-case approach, is 
regarded by some as the proper initial stage of 
planning. It should take as its departure point a 
fairly rigourous estimate of public sector resour-
ces for the life of the programme, both in terms 
of revenues and of the resources it expects to be 
able to borrow (or to be given in the form of 
grants-in-aid). Estimates of local resources need 
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also to be disaggregated from foreign exchange 
needs. 
Funds are allocated on the basis of explicit, 
agreed-upon sectoral priorities. The allocation 
within sectors is then made in accordance with a 
ranking based on the priorities of the sector, 
cost-benefit analyses, and any linkages or cata-
lytic effects in respect of other completed, ongo-
ing or slated projects. This co-ordinated group of 
projects makes up the programme for the sector. 
The various sectoral programmes are 
thereafter evaluated in order to maximize the 
aggregate benefits to be derived from a given 
quantum of investment and are ultimately inte-
grated into the National Investment Plan. This 
often medium-term plan has an annual compo-
nent which figures on the expenditure side of the 
national budget. It is usually evaluated on a 
yearly basis and may be updated or revised peri-
odically, depending upon performance in the 
previous year or changing priorities. 
Ideally, the public-sector investment pro-
gramme seeks to incorporate all the funding 
requests made by public agencies, including 
those of semi-autonomous public entities, since 
their obligations are usually guaranteed by the 
government and form part of the national debt. 
At this stage of the planning process the private 
sector is incorporated only in so far as the 
government sets out to influence the investment 
climate or to channel investment into specific 
areas; detailed private-sector investment prop-
osals are seldom available at this level of 
planning. 
The Comprehensive Plan takes a different 
approach. It begins with targets —or, more 
appropriately, target paths— for certain key ele-
ments in the economy, which are perceived to 
interact in specific ways. A simple overall equili-
brium model of the economy can thus be 
designed for the period covered by the plan, 
which is usually the medium term (three to six 
years). This ¡s a sufficient amount of time over 
which to maintain a consistent policy line and to 
see its results, but is not so long that forward 
predictions would become meaningless. Even so, 
the constant monitoring and readjustment of 
targets is essential. 
By monitoring the target growth path of, for 
example, the gross domestic product, the 
planner can gain some idea of the quantum of 
investment and savings which will be needed to 
attain the target based on investment and other 
coefficients, the amount of time needed in order 
for factors to be transferred and to become oper-
ational, etc. In order to do this, the planner draws 
on past experience, as well as taking into consid-
eration expectations of change during the plan 
period. While it is obvious that the accuracy of 
the coefficients and of the appropriate elastici-
ties is central to the exercise, this is difficult to 
achieve initially due to the weakness of the data 
bases and a shortage of the appropriate skills. 
Yet the process by which the planner arrives at 
these measurements (as well as the discipline 
needed to visualize and quantify the types of 
linkages between sectors) is essential if he is to 
be able to manage the economy effectively. In 
this way models of varying complexity may be 
developed to identify the rates of demand and 
supply, public and private consumption, savings, 
investment, employment, imports, exports, and 
so on which will result from the basic target 
paths. 
The comprehensive planning model not 
only takes into account the public-sector invest-
ment programme, but also incorporates budge-
tary targets based on estimated public-sector 
resources for the plan period, the projected 
investment of the private sector, and the 
expected impact of public policy on such invest-
ment. The model might also be arranged so as to 
provide some notion of the best allocation of 
resources between the public and private sectors. 
Initially, for Caribbean countries, a relatively 
simple model using four or five appropriately 
disaggregated production and consumption sec-
tors (such as agriculture, industry, services and, 
where appropriate, mining) might suffice to 
provide an adequate understanding of the way in 
which the economy interconnects and to allow 
the planner to select the basic tools needed for its 
management. 
Using these broad aggregates as a starting 
point, the plan then goes into detail concerning 
each of the sectors, which, for their part, will 
have drawn up their own sectoral investment 
programmes. In this way "top-down" and 
"bottom-up" planning approaches are pursued 
simultaneously. 
Once the detailed sectoral plans have been 
presented, the macro-planner will be in a better 
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position to evaluate the balances involved in 
greater detail. The planner needs to ensure not 
only that the supply of labour balances with the 
demand for it, but also that the necessary types of 
specific skills are available. Imports should, of 
course, balance with exports, but the composi-
tion of imports is also crucial since, for example, 
capital goods imports must be forthcoming in 
order to sustain the quantum of investment. 
Investment is possible only if the level of savings 
is adequate, but these savings must also be suffi-
ciently mobile in order to shift to those sectors 
on which investment priorities are placed. 
While some of these balances may be established 
through the operation of key price variables such 
as real wages, the exchange rate, and the cost of 
capital, other less tangible factors, such as confi-
dence, need to be considered as well. 
2. Sectoral planning 
An attempt has been made here to show that in 
order for sectoral planning to be successful, it 
must be compatible with the overall macro-
economic framework. A word also needs to be 
said, however, about sectoral planning itself. 
If such plans are to be relevant and imple-
mentable, the proposals advanced by the agricul-
ture sector planners must closely correspond to 
the needs and aspirations of the farming com-
munity itself. For agricultural policy, perhaps to 
a greater extent than some other sectors, 
depends for its success on a large number of 
small private actors. A level of consensus is 
therefore crucial as what to produce, what rate of 
increase is possible and feasible, and what 
impediments need to be removed in order to 
implement a given policy. 
Armed with an understanding of the prob-
lem and a measure of consensus, the sectoral 
planner will be in a better position to formulate 
more effective projects and to select the most 
effective instruments and policies for their 
implementation. (Appropriate pricing policies 
are obviously of great relevance in this regard.) 
The planner will also be in a stronger position to 
defend such policies and projects at the macro-
economic planning stage. 
A significant source of delay and wastage of 
resources in the implementation of sector plans 
is inadequate project selection and preparation. 
A pre-condition for overcoming this problem is 
a comprehensive evaluation of the sector as a 
whole. In agriculture, the preparation of such an 
assessment requires a sound knowledge of land 
resources, soil types and the consequent produc-
tion possibilities. It also needs to reflect a knowl-
edge of the relative prospects of development in 
areas such as forestry, animal husbandry and 
various crops, and should provide a relatively 
good idea of the relative efficiency of producing 
for export or for domestic consumption, of what 
crops are best, and of what the foreign and 
domestic markets can bear. Furthermore, the 
assessment should clearly identify those areas in 
which there are knowledge gaps and those in 
which further research is needed. 
Once potential projects have been identified, 
feasibility studies need to be prepared which take 
into account the economic, technical, financial 
and organizational aspects of the project so that 
it may ultimately be determined whether the 
costs are lower than the potential benefits and so 
that an effective ranking of the various project 
possibilities may be made. Are the necessary 
inputs available? What ancillary services are 
required? What of human and organizational 
skills? 
Effective project preparation is expensive 
and time-consuming and requires a certain basic 
minimum of specialized data. It is essentially a 
multidisciplinary exercise and hence skills-
intensive. Yet it is crucial if funds are not to be 
wasted on the implementation of non-viable 
projects; even more expensive is the budget sub-
sidy required far into the future to sustain the 
operation of badly-conceived projects. Paradoxi-
cally, the risk of this happening is highest when 
domestic resources are used or when the repay-
ment of project loans is guaranteed by the public 
sector, since multilateral donors normally tend 
to be more rigorous in assessing feasibility 
before disbursing such loans. Nevertheless, 
there is often a tendency for those impatient 
with the pace of development to regard the 
requirement of feasibility assessment as an 
impediment, and the temptations to circumvent 
the process are great. 
3. Constraints 
Before closing it might be useful to comment on 
two constraints which are sometimes used as 
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arguments for denying the efficacy of formal 
planning whenever the question arises in the 
Caribbean. They relate to the extreme openness 
of these economies and the quality of the data 
available to the planner. 
In economies as open to external factors as 
those of the Caribbean the planning discipline is 
faced with more constraints than is the case in 
larger and more self-sufficient economies. Since 
an open economy is subject to a much higher 
level of external vulnerability and therefore 
uncertainty, the planning process needs to be 
more flexible so that it can react to unforeseen 
circumstances, and a greater degree of attention 
must be paid to the review and readjustment of 
targets. At the same time, economic actors need 
to react rapidly —and, ideally, automatically— to 
external stimuli which create opportunities for 
expansion as well as potential risks of contrac-
tion. Price mechanisms which faithfully reflect 
external trends and impacts therefore have a 
central role to play in small open economies. 
In conclusion it may be useful to restate some of 
the main points made in the foregoing 
discussion: 
1) Planning, as defined in this article, is to be 
seen as a dynamic process which is an integral 
pa r t of imp lemen ta t i on and economic 
management; 
2) Since planning requires constant feed-
back and adjustment, it is a good idea to revise 
the plan on an annual basis; some planners 
adopt a rolling plan with this in mind; 
3) The type and degree of detail of the plan-
ning process is conditioned by the objective cir-
cumstances in each country and by what is 
deemed to be necessary, but is ultimately deter-
mined by what is feasible and what can be 
implemented; 
4) There must be a symbiotic relationship 
between the sector and the overall economic 
framework, such that the macro-economic 
Nevertheless, recent global trends suggest that 
even for the largest countries the idea of auto-
nomous economic action is rapidly becoming a 
myth. 
As regards the constraint represented by the 
available data, it is evident that the quality of the 
planning process is highly dependent upon the 
quality of information at the disposal of the 
planner. Statisticians often argue that the data 
set needs to be complete before planning can 
proceed, whereas economists may be willing to 
accept a less complete data set if it can be made 
available more quickly. In the real world one 
cannot await perfection; one must begin with 
the resources that are available, while hoping to 
improve them over time. It is also true that many 
of the Caribbean countries do not make the best 
possible use of the available data; nor is the 
collection of the data as systematic as it might be. 
In any event, the quality of the data clearly places 
some constraints on the type and extent of plan-
ning which is feasible. 
framework will be consistent with the goals and 
objectives of priority sectors, and vice versa; 
5) Ultimately, development is dependent 
upon a succession of viable and productive indi-
vidual projects in both the public and private 
sectors. The preparation of such projects is time-
consuming and expensive and requires a variety 
of skills. The planner can skimp on this prepara-
tory work, however, only at great risk to the 
long-term viability of the project; 
6) The implementation and operation of 
such projects requires effective management 
skills and ongoing monitoring to ensure their 
continuing viability; and, finally, 
7) Planning is data-intensive, but the pro-
cess cannot be held up until a perfect data set is 
obtained. The scope and comprehensiveness of 
the plan must, however, take the data con-
straints into account and work within them, 
even while providing for the eventual upgrading 
of the data base. 
I l l 
Summary and conclusions 
